Even Javier Milei was surprised by his unexpected victory in Argentina’s national midterm elections, as he admitted in an interview the day after the vote a month ago. Beforehand, it felt as if he was down and out, with many predicting he was finished politically as the peso-dollar exchange rate continued climbing higher, even with full US government support. What was particularly shocking was the victory in Buenos Aires Province—dubbed the “mother of all battles”—which came after Diego Santilli had to come off the bench to replace José Luis Espert, who was forced to resign his candidacy after it was revealed he received financing from a suspected drug trafficker.
Governor Axel Kicillof had achieved a crushing win over Milei’s candidates just two months earlier in local provincial elections, and the expectation was that libertarians would eat into that lead but still lose by several percentage points. Instead, winning Buenos Aires Province allowed Milei to consolidate a national victory that once again hands him a popular mandate to deliver on his campaign promise to “make Argentina great again.” The ball ireturned to his court.
Decoding the Victory
As the dust settled, analysts sought to identify the underlying forces behind the solid victory. Milei’s La Libertad Avanza coalition had only secured a single victory in local elections this year (Buenos Aires City) and suffered a beatdown in Buenos Aires Province. It entered the election amid a series of mini-financial crises where its major claim—dexterity on the economic front—was seriously in question.
A series of corruption accusations involving Espert and Presidential Chief-of-Staff Karina Milei rocked their standing in opinion polls as Milei’s credibility as an anti-caste crusader was put in doubt. The Cabinet completely lost its form too, with two ministers resigning before the election (Foreign Minister Gerardo Werthein and Justice Minister Mariano Cúneo Libarona), forcing the president to pre-announce a deep reshuffling of his team. Ultimately, he was forced to go to US President Donald Trump for an emergency bailout orchestrated by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent—a move many read as a bad omen.
The Fear Factor
The first hypothesis put on the table was the government’s own: fear of a return of Kirchnerism, particularly given that the Milei administration seemed to be unraveling ahead of the election. This galvanized anti-Peronist sentiment among a large portion of society. The ghost of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner returning to power, together with the specter of Kicillof, had been dubbed the “riesgo kuka” by Milei and Economy Minister Luis “Toto” Caputo, who suggested market turbulence was a consequence of potential electoral results. (“Kuka” is slang for cockroach and has become the main derogatory term used to refer to Kirchnerites by their antagonists.)
This line of thought was also expressed by International Monetary Fund chief Kristalina Georgieva when she called for Argentines to “stay the course” and vote for Milei. It aligns with Bessent’s public statements, all following Trump’s lead, when he essentially extorted the Argentine electorate by threatening to withdraw financial support in the face of a negative electoral outcome.
The Kirchner-Kicillof Debate
From Fernández de Kirchner’s perspective, Milei’s victory was sparked by Kicillof’s decision to decouple the local and national elections. Local mayors and municipal leaders were seen as instrumental in Peronism’s decisive victory in September, and that force and ground game was lacking in October. Having skin in the game, mayors had mobilized their electorates and ensured recognition. If the election had been held the same day, Cristina suggests, Peronist candidates in the national midterms would have benefited.
Kicillof rejects the accusation, indicating they had a decent performance in the national midterms and that without splitting the electoral calendar, Peronism would have suffered twin defeats instead of securing at least one win. But these are counterfactuals.
The Iron Triangle’s Internal War
Another argument strikes at the heart of the civil war within Milei’s “iron triangle” involving his sister and controversial political strategist Santiago Caputo. The pre-electoral chaos increasingly put Karina and her political lieutenants—Lower House Speaker Martín Menem and top advisor Eduardo “Lule” Menem, together with handler Sebastián Pareja—under the spotlight.
That group had argued for pursuing a “purist” strategy, by which La Libertad Avanza needed its own representation in every province. Allies would have to compete within the party structure, as happened with Mauricio Macri’s PRO in Buenos Aires Province. “Caputito” had been excluded from the core group of decision-makers as he sought to impose a strategy of local partners to benefit from their political structures.
As traditional campaigning found Milei facing empty venues and small crowds while his government was under constant assault, Caputo tried to position himself as the leader’s savior, including through his contacts with US conservatives with access to Trump’s inner circle. He reportedly organized the contentious Movistar Arena concert where the campaign was relaunched by the president himself, rocking out on stage. Mocked internationally, it was well received by his core followers.
The freelance political analyst was using his digital troll army to indicate he had been instrumental in securing US financial support to the detriment of Werthein, the sitting foreign minister. His next victim was Cabinet Chief Guillermo Francos, as stories emerged in the press about Caputo potentially formalizing his real power through a Cabinet role. Ultimately, he was left out.
In his victory speech, Milei said the iron triangle remains strong, meaning he reaffirms both Karina’s and Santiago’s roles. But the nationwide victory does blow wind into Karina’s political sails, even if Caputo’s hand in the final campaign stretch may have helped turn the tide. And while the Cabinet could continue to be rocked, it doesn’t seem like Francos has an expiration date.
The Centrist Failure
The lackluster performance of the Provincias Unidas banner represents the traditional failure of centrist coalitions in Argentina and could be another factor in the explanation. The expectation that local governors would leverage their local structures to secure a strong position in next year’s legislature fell extremely short.
In Córdoba, former governor and presidential candidate Juan Schiaretti was defeated by a relatively unknown libertarian, similar to Santa Fe Governor Maximiliano Pullaro’s lieutenant-governor. In Chubut, Governor Ignacio Torres’ candidate came in third. In Jujuy and Santa Cruz, Governors Carlos Sadir and Claudio Vidal also lost, while Corrientes’ Gustavo Valdés was the only one who secured a tight win.
The Road Ahead
At the end of the day, the actual result was secondary given that the Casa Rosada will need to seek circumstantial allies to pursue its reform agenda. Milei and his team know that the IMF and the White House are scrutinizing his moves as they await a structural reforms package that includes tax, pension, and labor reforms. These will require heavy lifting in terms of negotiation and consensus building, which hasn’t exactly been a house specialty.
Milei counts on a financial backstop from the US government and the predisposition of a majority of Argentine society to pursue a balanced budget while reforming the economy. Not that it’s an easy task given his three previous predecessors tried and failed at creating broader alliances that included other political parties and provincial governors.
Milei has acknowledged this in his victory speech and successive public appearances. He met with 18 of the 23 provincial governors in the aftermath of the election to garner support for his budget bill. While that’s an encouraging sign, the fact that he excluded four governors close to Kirchnerism is a red flag, together with his insistence that the economic model is flawless. With Diego Santilli having taken the post of Interior Minister, and Manuel Adorni in charge of the cabinet, they have shored up support for what is expected to be a crucial series of legislative meetings after the new Congress is sworn in.
The Critical Question
Will Milei take advantage of the opportunity he has been granted to pursue a constructive political and economic agenda for Argentina? Or will he use his newfound power to double down on his plan with no corrections, intensifying certain autocratic tendencies?
The current makeup of Congress suggests he should bet on dialogue; his previous actions indicate the opposite. Argentines have grown accustomed to being disappointed by their political class. Whether Milei will prove different—whether this unexpected electoral victory marks a genuine turning point or merely a temporary reprieve before the next crisis—remains the defining question of Argentine politics as the country moves into what many hope will be a period of stability and reform.
The pieces are in place: US financial backing, a popular mandate, declining inflation, and potential allies waiting to negotiate. What remains uncertain is whether Milei possesses the political maturity and pragmatism to use these tools wisely, or whether his combative instincts and ideological rigidity will once again squander a historic opportunity.
This piece was originally published in the Buenos Aires Times, Argentina’s only English-language newspaper.