Following a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, President Trump is now cleared to proceed with sweeping layoffs and structural changes at the Department of Education. In McMahon v. New York, the Court lifted a lower court’s injunction, allowing nearly 1,400 terminations to move forward as litigation continues.
The decision has raised concerns across multiple sectors of the Department, from civil rights enforcement to student aid processing. It has also intensified scrutiny of the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program. The PSLF program forgives student loans for people who work full-time in government or nonprofit jobs and make monthly payments for 10 years. Under the authority of a March executive order, the Department’s new rulemaking is reportedly narrowing PSLF eligibility, prompting deeper questions about who can afford to pursue public service careers and what that means for access to justice.
This is not the first time federal budget strategy has reshaped the public interest landscape.
In 1982, Reagan’s administration slashed LSC funding by 25%, forcing the closure of 285 legal aid offices across the country. In a report published by the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP), researchers detail how, in 1996, Congress—through the “Contract with America” agenda—cut the LSC budget by 31%, reducing it from $400 million to $278 million.
Along with these cuts came sweeping restrictions: LSC grantees were barred from filing class-action lawsuits, representing undocumented immigrants, engaging in welfare reform advocacy, or participating in redistricting cases. These measures did not just limit budget lines—they redefined the legal rights landscape for millions of Americans. By 1996, national and state-level support and training centers were eliminated, weakening institutional memory and advocacy capacity.
Through funding restrictions, staffing cuts, and targeted limitations on the types of cases LSC-funded lawyers could take, the federal government quietly narrowed legal representation for low-income Americans. Justified as fiscal discipline, the result was fewer tenant protections, reduced civil rights enforcement, and a shrinking legal footprint in underserved communities. These were not loud policy battles, they were quiet recalibrations. But their structural impacts endured.
Today, similar questions are emerging in a different arena: student loan forgiveness.
Specifically, the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program, designed to support professionals, particularly those in law, healthcare, and education, who commit to careers in the public interest. According to a July 2025, Forbes analysis by attorney and student loan expert Adam S. Minsky, under the rule changes introduced by the Trump administration, eligibility for PSLF has reportedly been narrowed for workers at certain nonprofit organizations, including legal aid and advocacy groups.
The shift does not eliminate PSLF, just as the Reagan-era moves did not eliminate legal services. But in both cases, policy changes redefine the boundary lines—what counts as public service, and who counts as a public servant.
Could administrative rulemaking around student debt have long-term consequences similar to those triggered by legal aid restrictions in the 1980s? If PSLF exclusions shrink the incentive for graduates to pursue lower-paying public service roles, what might the downstream effects be on public access to legal and social support systems?
It is worth considering the mechanics of PSLF in broader economic terms. The program was crafted to address a structural market failure. Many essential public service roles, such as defending tenants, advocating for the wrongly convicted, or counseling trauma survivors, offer deep social value but relatively low compensation. PSLF helps close that gap. It replaces financial penalty with long-term reward. It allows mission to matter.
But if forgiveness is no longer reliable, or if it is reinterpreted so narrowly that only certain nonprofit roles qualify, how might that influence the career calculus of new graduates?
Already, the average law school graduate carries over $160,000 in debt, according to the American Bar Association. That figure can make civil rights law or post-conviction representation feel economically unsustainable, even for those deeply committed to justice.
And it is not just about individual decisions. It is about systemic infrastructure.
Nonprofits engaged in housing litigation, parole advocacy, or immigrant legal defense often rely on early-career professionals whose participation is enabled by PSLF. When that eligibility is revoked or challenged, the recruiting pipeline constricts. The result: fewer staff, fewer cases, and fewer checks on inequality.
We have seen this story before.
In 2012, Congress proposed slashing LSC funding again—this time by 26%, which would have denied legal aid to more than 235,000 low-income Americans. In 2015, a House bill cut $75 million from LSC’s budget—nearly 20%—bringing it down to $300 million, the lowest since 1999. The 2025 House proposal once again aimed to reduce LSC funding by $71 million, which would have meant 272,248 fewer clients served, including 117,883 children, 24,503 domestic violence survivors, and 4,924 veterans.
This raises broader questions. What happens when mission-driven work becomes unaffordable? Who gets to serve, and who gets served, when policy shifts make certain forms of justice work economically unviable?
Public interest work is, in many ways, a public good. But when support for it is quietly eroded, the cost is absorbed elsewhere, often by communities already marginalized, by courtrooms already overburdened, and by rights already precarious. It is the same structural logic we saw with Reagan’s approach to legal aid. Change the incentives, and the ecosystem will change with it. Not through loud reversals, but through slow attrition. And this time, the stakes are not just about access to a lawyer. They are about the future of the public service labor force itself: who enters it, who stays in it, and whether its existence remains viable at scale. These policy choices—how we fund legal aid and how we forgive student debt—are also signals. They tell a generation of graduates whether the system values justice as a career path or merely as a rhetorical ideal. They suggest whether public service is seen as investment-worthy or expendable.
History suggests that when incentives shift, access often shifts with them. And as federal priorities evolve, so too does the architecture of justice and equity—quietly, structurally, and often without much debate.