If recent reports are accurate, China has begun to give Russia significant competition in the lucrative Middle Eastern and North African arms market, especially when it comes to exports of air defense systems.
Iran has received Chinese surface-to-air missile systems since the recent 12-day war with Israel, the London-based Middle East Eye outlet reported Monday, citing Arab officials. It’s unclear how many systems or which type Iran has received, although the report states Tehran is paying with oil shipments.
The HQ-9 is China’s version of the Russian S-300, and the HQ-9B is an extended-range version. Export variants are known as the FD-2000 and FD-2000B, respectively.
Any timely delivery of the HQ-9B/FD-2000B, in particular, to Tehran would send a strong signal to Moscow. Until recently, the most advanced air defense system Iran ever imported was the Russian S-300 PMU-2, which Tehran received in 2016. However, in two rounds of strikes in April and October 2024, Israel disabled the majority, if not the entirety, of Iran’s S-300 arsenal without suffering any losses. The 12-day war in June likely destroyed any of the remaining S-300 components. Iran paid approximately $1 billion for these missile defense systems and waited almost a decade for delivery.
Aside from its disappointment with the S-300’s performance, Tehran is undoubtedly frustrated with Russia’s non-delivery of Su-35 Flanker fighter jets that it ordered and paid for early in this decade. Such disappointment, coupled with an urgent need to rebuild its air defense, may prompt Iran to pursue China’s Chengdu J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter instead, especially if it’s satisfied with Beijing’s prompt delivery of surface-to-air missiles in its urgent time of need.
The reported Iran SAM delivery came little more than a week after retired high-ranking Egyptian military official Samir Farag confirmed Egypt’s acquisition of the HQ-9B in an interview with Egypt’s Sada El-Balad TV. The Diplomat also reported in May that Cairo had confirmed purchasing the HQ-9B and speculated Beijing “may use Y-20 aircraft to deliver HQ-9B systems to Egypt, just as it previously transported HQ-22 air defense missile systems to Serbia when the landlocked European country was virtually isolated.”
The last comparable strategic air defense system Egypt ordered was Russia’s S-300VM system in the mid-2010s. In the intervening decade, it has also ordered medium-range IRIS-T systems from Germany, which it displayed for the first time in October 2024. Choosing the HQ-9B over additional S-300VMs aligns with Cairo’s consistent preference for diversifying its military arsenal as much as feasible. Nevertheless, it’s also a way of hedging against chronic delays in Russia’s supply of spare parts of technical support for foreign operators of Russian military hardware in the wake of its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. After all, if Egypt’s S-300VMs became inoperable, that could severely undermine its overall strategic air defense if it lacked any alternative and comparable system such as the HQ-9B.
Furthermore, Egypt canceled its 2018 order for Su-35 out of fear of incurring American sanctions. China’s recent deployment of J-10Cs to Egypt for a joint exercise fueled speculation that Cairo might acquire that Chinese jet instead, which would mark another win for Beijing over Moscow in the region.
Algeria recently took delivery of some Su-35s originally built for Egypt from the same batch many speculated Iran would ultimately receive. Algiers still purchases a majority of its military hardware from Russia and reportedly recently acquired the more sophisticated Russian S-400 to enhance its air defense, which already includes S-300s. Incidentally, Algeria’s neighbor and rival, Morocco, may have acquired the FD-2000B in 2021.
With the conspicuous exception of Algeria, interest in Russia’s strategic S-300 and S-400 systems might have already peaked throughout the wider region. Russia withdrew the S-300 system that it nominally delivered to Syria over two years before the regime of Bashar al-Assad finally collapsed in December 2024. Iran’s S-300s have gone up in smoke and, if the Middle East Eye report proves accurate, won’t be replaced by additional S-300s or even newer S-400s, especially if China has proven willing to supply HQ-9Bs or another comparable system like the HQ-22.
In an exceptional and exceptionally costly move, NATO member Turkey received S-400s in 2019 but never put them in service nor exercised its option to acquire a second batch. Those Russian systems remain in storage as Ankara again attempts to regain admission into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, from which Washington suspended it due to that contentious acquisition.
While Russia marketed its S-300s and S-400s to the Arab Gulf states, none of them ultimately purchased any, even though the United Arab Emirates and, much more recently and secretly, Saudi Arabia did acquire medium-range Russian Pantsir-S1s. However, these states aren’t opting for Chinese systems either. Saudi Arabia inaugurated its first company for its U.S.-made THAAD systems on July 2. Additionally, both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have ordered the medium-range KM-SAM from South Korea in recent years, as has Iraq, which considered purchasing the S-400 in 2018.
At least two recent Middle Eastern buyers of high-end Russian air defenses have reportedly turned to China for surface-to-air capabilities. In Iran’s case, it may never trust Russia as a supplier again due to the Su-35 case, nor trust the reliability of Russian weapons due to the devastating S-300 losses it has endured. In Egypt’s case, it may not opt for Russian air defenses again due to the risk of incurring U.S. sanctions.
On the other hand, Turkey’s S-400 acquisition was a one-off that Ankara may now privately regret, although it is unlikely to lead the NATO member to consider buying Chinese systems. Ankara had previously ordered the FD-2000 in 2013 as part of a $3.4 billion joint production agreement that it later canceled under pressure from the U.S. and NATO.
Today, it appears that China may have begun making rapid inroads in those very same parts of the Middle Eastern arms market that Russia, for various reasons, has recently been losing out on, possibly for good.