Qatar recently became the latest of the three wealthiest and most prominent Arab Gulf states and Gulf Cooperation Council members to have successfully used its modern, multilayered air defense in combat.
The ferocious 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June ended with a ceasefire shortly after Iran launched a ballistic missile attack against Qatar’s enormous Al-Udeid airbase, which hosts American troops, on June 23. Tehran warned of the attack hours in advance, giving Doha time to organize its defense.
What Qatar stood up was not unimpressive for such a tiny country. In the air, it dispatched advanced F-15QA (Qatar Advanced) “Ababil” Strike Eagle fighter jets on combat air patrols, scanning its airspace for incoming targets. At the same time, Qatari AH-64E Apache helicopter gunships also conducted patrols, forming another defensive layer against any incoming or low-flying drone that managed to bypass the Strike Eagles. (Helicopters have served as an imperfect defense against drones in the ongoing conflicts in Israel and Ukraine.)
Qatar’s ground-based air defenses consist of MIM-104 Patriot PAC-3s, which utilize hit-to-kill interceptors against incoming ballistic missiles, and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile systems, which fire AIM-120 missiles that are suitable against enemy fighter jets, drones, and cruise missiles.
In the end, Iran launched 19 ballistic missiles, which Qatar’s Patriots single-handedly intercepted.
The array of combined systems Doha had at the ready that night could probably have held their own against a limited missile and drone attack of the kind Iran and its regional militia proxies have previously executed.
When the United Arab Emirates found its capital, Abu Dhabi, under an unprecedented drone and missile barrage by the Houthis in Yemen in January 2022, it organized its air defense similarly. Its American-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system was the first-ever to intercept a ballistic missile in combat. Furthermore, the UAE similarly relied on its F-16s and Mirage 2000 fighter jets to conduct continuous air patrols to detect and intercept any additional attack drones.
Saudi Arabia officially inaugurated its first THAAD unit on July 3. During the June war, Iran’s enormous ballistic missile barrages on Israel put an incredible strain on the two U.S. military THAAD batteries forward-deployed in Israel. According to the Wall Street Journal, the U.S. military fired over 150 THAAD interceptors during that relatively brief conflict, prompting the Pentagon to contemplate a plan for diverting interceptor rounds Saudi Arabia had ordered.Riyadh reportedly refused a subsequent request for its interceptors.
The Saudis no doubt understand how quickly one can run out of such critical interceptors, even in comparably low-intensity conflicts. After all, near the end of its seven-year war with the Houthis three years ago, the kingdom ran dangerously low on Patriot interceptor missiles. It similarly urged regional states to help by digging into their stockpiles to help prevent it from running out of ammunition, which could have left Saudi cities and oil facilities much more vulnerable. The kingdom similarly fired substantial numbers of expensive AIM-120s from fighter jets while intercepting comparably inexpensive incoming Houthi drones.
Saudi Arabia intercepted Houthi munitions fired at Israel early in the regional conflicts that started in October 2023 and shared intelligence that helped counter Iran’s first direct missile and drone attack on Israel in April 2024. A more recent unconfirmed report claims Saudi Arabia even dispatched helicopters over Iraq and Jordan to shoot down Iranian drones, although that seems questionable.
Whatever the case, it’s hardly surprising that the kingdom may have proven unwilling to potentially delay pressing its THAAD into service by diverting precious interceptors to the U.S. military in Israel.
Other recent acquisitions suggest Riyadh is doing all it can to reinforce its multilayered air defense in an increasingly volatile Middle East. Along with the UAE, it recently ordered South Korea’s medium-range KM-SAM system, which also has anti-ballistic capabilities. As previously outlined in this space, it has reportedly acquired Pantsir-S1s from Russia, another capability the UAE already has, which are well-suited for providing relatively cost-effective point defense of high-value targets against threats like Houthi drones.
Additionally, Saudi Arabia has ordered Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems—70 mm Hydra rockets converted into precision-guided munitions that fighter jets can use against drones—from the United States. Not only is the APKWS much cheaper than AIM-120s and other traditional air-to-air missiles, but they are also a lot smaller, meaning an aircraft can carry significantly larger numbers.
With the high-end THAAD and Patriot, Saudi Arabia seeks the best tools to prepare itself against large-scale ballistic missile attacks like Iran’s against Israel. At the same time, systems like the Pantsir-S1 and APKWS also prepare it for a more protracted conflict with an asymmetrical adversary, such as the Houthis, which would seek to deplete its expensive interceptors more gradually.
All these incidents demonstrate that these Gulf states recognize the growing need to develop a multilayered air defense capable of countering the numerous and ever-present threats from Middle Eastern skies in the turbulent 2020s.