Two of the key, recent headline stories have related to climate, and central banking. We cannot escape the dramatic evidence of climate damage across the world, and recurring high temperature records. In central banking, both the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve raised rates last week in attempts to cool economies (inflation). If they succeed, they might even temper the heatwaves that grip many parts of the earth.
What is interesting about climate damage and central banking is that since the early 2000’s, both have embarked on trend changes. As the Hadley Centre database shows, excess world average temperatures have broken away from the levels of the past one hundred and fifty years, and now the average annual temperature of the earth’s land is about 1.5% higher than the long-term average. Similarly, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the balance sheets of the major central banks, notably the Federal Reserve, expanded dramatically as central banks enacted quantitative easing (QE) programs, even more so through the COVID crisis.
It is tempting to say that the liquidity provided by QE programs provided the fuel to drive climate damage. I am not sure that this is the case in a strict econometric sense, though QE has enabled a lot of poor or suboptimal investment (and possibly excess consumption). It is correct, I think, to say that both the existence of QE (as a sign that economies and financial systems were too fragile and required monetary morphine) and manifest climate damage, are warning signs that the world economy is reaching the limits of modus operandi, and possibly its very existence.
Buying Peace
In particular, the contribution of QE was to buy ‘peace’. To paper over cracks or deficiencies in financial systems (the euro-zone), to create a wealth effect (for the wealthy) and to flatten the implications of tail-risk events – from the initial Russian invasion of Crimea to most notably COVID. As a form of ‘glue’ that kept the de-globalizing world together it was a success, but it created a deep dependency and dulled politicians and corporate leaders to rising risk factors.
What is new is that not only is QE in retreat (central bank balance sheets have again recently begun to edge backwards), but the policy framework behind QE is beginning to change. There were two new developments last week.
One was that the Bank of England, long the benchmark for other central banks, finds its credibility dented across various areas. Its forecasting ability is now subject to a post-mortem, led by Ben Bernanke, because according to comments from some members of the monetary policy committee, the banks forecasting models work well on the past, but are not suited to the future.
More alarmingly, in accounting terms, the Bank has made losses of over GBP 150 bn on its QE led market interventions. I am surprised that populists in the UK have not made more of this (they are perhaps more occupied with NatWest), though in Italian politics there are now frequent verbal assaults on the ECB.
BoJ owns the bond market
Another notable move is the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) attempt to loosen its control on the long end of the Japanese bond market (‘yield curve control’), which has so far not detonated any major volatility across bond markets. The BoJ is significant in at least two respects. First, it owns just over half of the entire Japanese bond market, and secondly it has been the last hold-out in the trend towards monetary policy normalization.
The upshot of all of this is that in a world where inflation has been curbed but not controlled, the consequences of higher rates will become increasingly obvious, at first in specific sections of the real estate market, and within some household segments. There has so far been a near miraculous absence of credit risk internationally, but I find it hard to see how this can continue, and there is plenty of scope for markets to reprice this.
Central banks, when they prosecuted QE, were the indispensable friends of the political classes – effectively removing the urgency to deal with pressing issues (reform of the euro-zone and national economic structures for instance). Now, the consequences of their (necessary) actions makes life more difficult for incumbent politicians (witness the UK housing market).
I expect that in the political economic landscape, central bankers will be less and less popular, at least until they have to ‘rescue’ the world when the next crisis arrives. A healthy development might be that they stop stretching their mandates to encompass policy topics like climate change (Lagarde) and unemployment (Yellen) that governments should and need to deal with, and that way we might get somewhere on climate damage control.