The security dynamic in the state of Michoacan, Mexico is complicated by the complex web of relationships between armed criminal groups, business interests, and local political leaders.
In recent years, the state in south-western Mexico has been rocked by ongoing pattern of violent attacks by organized crime groups. MichoacĂĄn has recorded over 10,000 murders during the presidency of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, which started in December, 2018. On March 10, 2023 gunmen from the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CNGJ) staged a series of attacks in different towns in MichoacĂĄn, killing three people. Cartel gunmen in MichoacĂĄn have also employed drones to launch bomb attacks against residents in the state. In 2022, in one incident that garnered national attention, gunmen attacked a funeral in a town in MichoacĂĄn, killing somewhere between 10 and 17 people and then loaded the bodies into their trucks and driving away. Organized crime groups in MichoacĂĄn have also buried land mines along roadways in rural areas. In 2022, cartel gunmen used a buried IED to attack a military convoy.
MichoacĂĄn also stands out in Mexico because of the presence of armed civilian âautodefensaâ self defense forces, who man road blocks and claim to defend various towns in the state. The autodefensa movement first emerged in 2013 and has now existed for over a decade.
In 2023, the state of MichoacĂĄn continues to struggle with a complicated mix of social, economic, and security problems. Right now, MichoacĂĄn produces around three quarters of the avocado grown in Mexico, a crop that earned a record-breaking $3.1 billion in export revenue from U.S. buyers in 2022. Although MichoacĂĄn has found success exporting avocados, around half the stateâs residents live in poverty. In 2023, the state of Michoacan continues to struggle with a complicated mix of social, economic, and security problems. Foreign executives doing due diligence on potential investment projects as well as foreign tourists considering visiting Mexico need to understand the risks arisings from security problems and organized crime activity in MichoacĂĄn. The factors driving violence in MichoacĂĄn are complex but are helpful for understanding Mexicoâs federal governmentâs broader struggle with fighting organized crime activity and reducing violent crime.
In order to discuss the current security dynamic in MichoacĂĄn, I reached out to Falko Ernst, a Senior Mexico Analyst at the International Crisis Group, an independent NGO.
Nathaniel Parish Flannery: What three words would you pick to describe the current security dynamic in MichoacĂĄn?
Falko Ernst: The three words Iâd use to describe the current dynamic in MichoacĂĄn are political, fragmented, and diversified.
I say political because, from the outside, itâs tempting to exclusively focus on the most visible part of the conflict: the guys on the ground with the AKs. But, their existence is the result of negotiations with state institutions and officials. Too many government officials and public servants are on the take, enabling armed groups to bend law and state action in their interest. Elections are a key arena where both sides integrate. Criminal groups translate territorial control into the ability to channel blocks of votes and financing to candidates. Once in office, the favors they owe undercut the notion of the public good as a priority. Within the geographic areas in which they operate, criminal groups also exercise population control â and from that perspective, they are de facto political actors.
I also say fragmented because as the once-dominant Knights Templar got broken up during the autodefensa emergence over the last decade, leaving behind a plethora of smaller parts that have carved the territory up into a mosaic of fiefdoms and unstable borders. None of these groups has amassed enough power to steamroll the opposition, entailing perpetual conflict.
The dynamic In MichoacĂĄn is diversified because although drugs still matter they are today part of a multi-commodity criminal approach. Violence is employed to build deep territorial control and tap into a variety of illicit and licit economies, chiefly through extortion. The portfolio today is wider than ever. In MichoacĂĄn, apart from illicit drugs, organized crime is also involved in cattle, limes, avocados, mangos, iron ore, and more. This brings great resilience in refinancing, both for individual criminal groups and the conflicts between them.
Parish Flannery: What’s one big concept you think people need to understand about the security dynamic in MichoacĂĄn?
Ernst: The big concept I think people need to understand about MichoacĂĄn is that the violence there, as is the case in other parts of Mexico, is due to a breakdown in the way corruption operates. In Mexico, corruption has become dysfunctional. During much of the 20th century, a more powerful, centralized state could impose a greater degree of order through informal ties with criminal groups and other local strongmen. But as a paradoxical effect of democratization and its multi-party system that hasnât been paired with effective transparency and accountability, state-crime ties have become deeply unstable. This has been further accentuated through security strategies breaking up criminal groups without holistic follow-up â for instance by targeting officials as central nodes of criminal networks and providing social and economic alternatives for populations susceptible to participating in criminal economies. What has elevated lethal violence to its current levels is this double-headed fragmentation. Many fragments of state institutions are occupied by groups of officials seeking their own benefit and engaging in deals with different criminal groups. You end up with a mosaic of state-crime networks that compete with each other to the effect that none has become dominant. For criminal groups, this is a problem. State actors arenât able to provide effective contracts and protection. Instead of being able to rely on more peaceful means â such as bribes and votes â violence becomes the main language of negotiation.
Parish Flannery: Overall, what grade would you give President Lopez Obrador for his security policies?
Ernst: If I had to give Lopez Obrador a grade for his security policies in MichoacĂĄn, Iâd give him a D-. Lopez Obrador seems to be willing to pivot toward an approach that doesnât seek to eradicate corruption and organized crime but to manage it down to more acceptable levels. Given that the Mexican people have borne the brunt of the âwar on drugsâ, that is to a degree understandable. However, the execution of this new strategy has been poor at best. The most striking illustration of this is the fact that to date, in spite of their increasing prominence in public security, the armed forces have not been equipped with a clear strategy or operational profile. In Mexico, Lopez Obradorâs National Guard act ad-hoc and reactively, only after things flare up, not before to prevent violent outbreaks. The degree of passiveness, also manifest in MichoacĂĄn, allows criminal groups to âfatten upâ, as one local criminal leader recently told me. They dig in deeper, increasing their sway over local politics, economies, and populations. This means that Mexicoâs conflicts are growing harder to resolve by the day. And at the end of the day, itâs civilians paying the cost.
Additional Reading: Mexicoâs President Does Not Know How To Fight Crime